SHIELDWORKZ

OT Security Foundational Guide

A Practitioner's Reference for Building and Maturing Industrial Cybersecurity Programs



This page has been intentionally left blank

About This Guide

This OT Security Foundation Guide has been developed by Shieldworkz as a practitioner-focused reference for organizations building or maturing Operational Technology (OT) cybersecurity programs across manufacturing, energy, oil & gas, utilities, water, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food & beverage, mining, and transportation sectors.

The guide is intended for CISOs, CIOs, OT Security Managers, Plant Managers, Industrial Automation Engineers, Control System and SCADA Engineers, Operations Managers, OT Architects, SOC Analysts, Risk Managers, Compliance Officers, and Executive Leadership.

Scope and sourcing discipline: this document draws on internationally recognized standards and guidance, including IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, NIST SP 800-53/800-30/800-37/800-61, NERC CIP, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27019, the EU NIS2 Directive, the EU Cyber Resilience Act, UAE Information Assurance Regulations, the Saudi Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC), and the Australian Essential Eight. Throughout this guide, requirements are explicitly labeled as follows:

Label	Meaning
NORMATIVE REQUIREMENT	A mandatory clause or control explicitly defined by a cited standard or regulation, applicable within that standard's stated scope.
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE	A practice recommended by a standard body (e.g., a NIST 'should' control, or an IEC 62443 recommended-but-not-mandatory element) but not universally mandatory.
INDUSTRY GUIDANCE	Widely accepted practice drawn from industry bodies, ISACs, or public post-incident analyses, without a single binding source.
IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE	Shieldworkz practitioner guidance based on field experience; explicitly not a normative requirement of any standard.

Where a topic falls outside the scope of a cited standard, this is stated explicitly rather than implied. No clause numbers, control identifiers, or compliance obligations have been fabricated; where Shieldworkz was not able to verify a specific clause reference at the time of writing, general scope language is used instead of an invented citation.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

What Operational Technology Is

Operational Technology (OT) refers to the hardware and software that detects or causes changes in physical processes through direct monitoring and control of physical devices — pumps, valves, breakers, robots, conveyors, turbines, and similar equipment. OT encompasses Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), and the engineering and operator systems used to configure and supervise them.

OT is the technology layer that keeps power flowing, water treated, medicines manufactured, and production lines running. It exists wherever a digital system makes a physical thing happen in the real world, as distinct from Information Technology (IT), which primarily processes, stores, and transmits data.

Why OT Security Is Fundamentally Different from IT Security

OT security cannot be approached as a subset of IT security. The two domains share some technology (networks, operating systems, protocols) but differ sharply in priorities, risk tolerance, and operational constraints:

- Safety and physical consequence: a compromised OT system can result in equipment damage, environmental release, or loss of life, not merely data loss.
- Availability trumps confidentiality: continuous, safe operation of a process is usually the top priority, ahead of data confidentiality, reversing the classic IT CIA-triad emphasis.
- Long asset lifecycles: OT equipment commonly remains in service for 15–25+ years, often running unsupported operating systems that cannot be patched without vendor revalidation.
- Limited or no maintenance windows: many OT processes run continuously (24x7x365) with change windows measured in hours per year, not the frequent patch cycles common in IT.
- Deterministic, real-time behavior: control loops depend on predictable timing; security controls that introduce latency or jitter (e.g., some IT-style endpoint agents) can themselves create safety or process risk.
- Physical and cyber convergence: many attacks that matter most to OT operators originate on the IT side and cross into OT through poorly segmented networks.

The Business Impact of OT Cyber Incidents

Unlike IT incidents, where impact is often measured in data loss or business disruption costs, OT incidents can result in:

- Unplanned production downtime and lost revenue, often measured in hours-to-weeks depending on recovery complexity.
- Physical damage to capital equipment that may take months to replace given long lead times for specialized industrial hardware.

- Safety incidents, including injury or loss of life, where safety instrumented systems are bypassed or disabled.
- Environmental releases or regulatory violations with associated fines and reputational damage.
- Erosion of customer and regulator trust, and in listed companies, potential impact on share price and insurance terms.
- Extended recovery timelines where engineering documentation, configuration backups, or spare parts are unavailable.

The Evolving OT Threat Landscape

Industrial organizations face a threat landscape that has matured significantly. Nation-state actors increasingly pre-position inside critical infrastructure for potential future disruption rather than immediate effect. Ransomware groups, while historically IT-focused, now routinely cause OT shutdowns as a side effect of encrypting IT systems that OT depends on (such as engineering workstations, historians, or IT/OT gateway servers), and some strains have demonstrated OT-aware capability. Hacktivist and ideologically motivated groups have shown willingness to target internet-exposed OT devices directly, including PLCs and human-machine interfaces (HMIs), particularly in water and energy sectors.

Common entry vectors include remote access services with weak or absent multi-factor authentication, compromised vendor and third-party connections, phishing that lands in IT and pivots into OT through flat or poorly segmented networks, and removable media introduced during maintenance activity.

Key Challenges Facing Industrial Organizations

- Incomplete or outdated OT asset inventories, making risk assessment and incident response difficult.
- Legacy and unsupported systems that cannot be patched using conventional IT patch management approaches.
- Cultural and organizational divides between IT security teams and OT engineering/operations teams.
- Vendor and third-party remote access that is often poorly governed or persistently open.
- Resource and budget constraints, particularly for mid-sized industrial operators.
- Regulatory complexity, with organizations often subject to multiple overlapping regional and sector-specific frameworks.
- Compliance fatigue, where audit and reporting burden competes with genuine risk-reduction activity.

Top Recommendations for Organizations Beginning Their OT Security Journey

1. Secure executive sponsorship and establish OT security governance with clear roles across IT, OT engineering, and operations.

2. Build and maintain a comprehensive OT asset inventory before investing heavily in tooling — visibility is the foundation of every subsequent control.
3. Assess and document current network architecture, focusing on IT/OT boundary points and any flat or unsegmented zones.
4. Eliminate or tightly control unmanaged remote access into OT environments, prioritizing multi-factor authentication and session recording.
5. Adopt a recognized reference framework (IEC 62443 and/or NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3) rather than building controls ad hoc.
6. Implement passive, non-intrusive network monitoring before considering active scanning or agent-based tools on sensitive OT assets.
7. Develop an OT-specific incident response plan that accounts for safety, production continuity, and regulatory reporting obligations.
8. Treat OT security as a continuous program with recurring risk assessment, not a one-time project.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Shieldworkz's field experience across manufacturing, energy, water, and pharmaceutical environments consistently shows that asset visibility and network segmentation deliver the greatest early risk reduction per unit of effort. Organizations beginning their OT security journey should prioritize these two areas above tool acquisition.

Section 1 — Understanding Operational Technology

1.1 What Is OT?

Operational Technology (OT) is hardware and software that monitors and controls physical devices, processes, and events in industrial and infrastructure environments. OT systems bridge the digital and physical worlds: a command issued in software results in a valve opening, a motor starting, or a breaker tripping.

1.2 Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

ICS is an umbrella term covering the various control system types found in industrial environments, including SCADA systems, DCS, and PLC-based systems, along with the associated instrumentation used to monitor and control industrial processes. NIST SP 800-82 uses ICS as the overarching term for this guide's purposes.

SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems provide centralized monitoring and control over geographically dispersed assets, such as pipelines, electrical transmission networks, and water distribution systems. SCADA typically combines a central control room, communication infrastructure (often over wide-area networks), and remote field devices.

Distributed Control Systems (DCS)

DCS architectures are typically used within a single site or facility (such as a refinery or a chemical plant) where control functions are distributed across multiple controllers close to the process, coordinated through a common supervisory layer. DCS environments tend to have tighter integration and lower latency requirements than wide-area SCADA.

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)

PLCs are ruggedized industrial computers that execute control logic (commonly ladder logic, structured text, or function block diagrams) to directly operate field devices based on sensor inputs. PLCs are a primary target in several publicly documented OT attacks because compromising the controller allows direct manipulation of the physical process.

Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)

RTUs interface with field sensors and actuators, converting physical signals into data communicated to a SCADA master, and are widely used in geographically distributed environments such as electric utilities, oil and gas pipelines, and water networks.

Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs)

HMIs provide the graphical interface through which operators monitor process status and issue commands. HMIs are a frequent target for attackers because they offer a direct, often minimally authenticated, path to process manipulation.

Engineering Workstations

Engineering workstations run vendor configuration software used to program PLCs, DCS controllers, and safety systems. Because they can push new logic directly to controllers, engineering workstations are among the highest-value and highest-risk assets in an OT environment.

Historians

Historians are databases that log process data over time for trending, reporting, and regulatory purposes. Historians often sit at the boundary between OT and IT and are a common pivot point in attacks.

Industrial Networks

Industrial networks carry the traffic between controllers, I/O, HMIs, and supervisory systems, using both IT-derived protocols (Ethernet/IP, Modbus TCP) and legacy fieldbus and serial protocols (Modbus RTU, Profibus, HART) with varying degrees of native security.

Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)

SIS are independent systems designed to bring a process to a safe state when predefined unsafe conditions are detected, separate from the basic process control system. SIS integrity is paramount: the TRITON/TRISIS incident (covered in Section 3) specifically targeted a SIS controller, representing one of the most consequential publicly documented OT attacks to date.

Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)

IIoT refers to internet-connected sensors, actuators, and edge devices increasingly deployed for condition monitoring, predictive maintenance, and process optimization. IIoT devices often connect directly or indirectly to cloud platforms, introducing new attack surface at the OT/cloud boundary that traditional Purdue-model thinking does not fully address.

1.3 The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA)

The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (also referenced within ISA-95) is a widely used conceptual model for segmenting industrial environments into logical levels, each with different function, risk profile, and security requirements. It remains a foundational — though not the only — reference model used in OT network design and is referenced in ISA/IEC 62443 concepts of zones and conduits.

```
Level 5   Enterprise Network (ERP, corporate IT, email, internet)
Level 4   Site Business & Logistics (business planning, IT servers)
----------------- IT/OT DMZ (data diodes, jump hosts, brokers) ---------
Level 3   Operations Management (MES, OT historians, patch mgmt servers)
Level 2   Supervisory Control (HMI, SCADA servers, engineering stations)
Level 1   Basic Control (PLCs, DCS controllers, RTUs, SIS logic solvers)
Level 0   Physical Process (sensors, actuators, motors, valves, drives)
```

Modern architectures increasingly implement a dedicated IT/OT DMZ between Levels 3 and 4 as the primary enforcement boundary, consistent with ISA/IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit concepts, rather than allowing direct traffic between enterprise IT and OT supervisory layers.

> **INDUSTRY GUIDANCE**

> Many real-world environments, particularly IIoT-heavy and cloud-connected operations, no longer fit a clean Purdue hierarchy. Shieldworkz treats PERA as a useful reference model for reasoning about segmentation, not as a mandatory architecture — organizations should adapt zone and conduit design to their actual data flows rather than forcing a strict level-by-level structure.

1.4 IT vs. OT vs. IIoT — A Comparative View

Dimension	IT	OT	IIoT
Primary priority	Confidentiality, then Integrity, then Availability	Safety and Availability, then Integrity, then Confidentiality	Varies; often availability + data integrity for analytics
Asset lifecycle	3–5 years	15–25+ years	3–7 years, but often unmanaged post-install
Patch cadence	Regular, often automated	Infrequent, vendor-validated, scheduled outages	Vendor-dependent, frequently neglected
Availability requirement	Business hours to 24x7	Continuous, safety-critical	Continuous but often tolerant of brief loss
Change control	Frequent, CI/CD-driven in places	Rigorous, formally scheduled, safety-reviewed	Often informal or vendor-managed
Typical protocols	TCP/IP, HTTP/S, standard app protocols	Modbus, DNP3, Profibus, EtherNet/IP, OPC, HART	MQTT, CoAP, cloud APIs, cellular/LPWAN
Physical consequence of failure	Data/service disruption	Equipment damage, safety, environmental impact	Depends on integration depth with control layer

1.5 Reference Industrial Network Architecture

The diagram below illustrates a representative segmented architecture consistent with common IEC 62443 zone/conduit and Purdue-derived practice. Actual designs should reflect a site-specific risk assessment rather than be copied without adaptation.



> **RECOMMENDED PRACTICE**
>
> IEC 62443-3-3 and related guidance recommend that Safety Instrumented Systems be segmented from the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) network, with independent access control, to prevent a BPCS compromise from directly reaching safety logic. This is widely recommended practice; specific implementation (physical vs. logical separation) is an organization-specific engineering decision.

Section 2 — OT Security Fundamentals

This section outlines the core principles that distinguish OT security practice from conventional IT security, and explains why IT-native approaches, applied without adaptation, frequently fail in industrial environments.

2.1 Safety First

In OT, personnel and public safety takes precedence over every other security objective. Any security control — network monitoring, endpoint protection, patching, access restriction — must be evaluated for its potential to interfere with safe operation before it is deployed. This principle is reflected across IEC 62443, which explicitly positions safety as a foundational consideration in secure system design.

2.2 Availability Over Confidentiality

Where IT security commonly orders priorities as Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (the CIA triad), OT environments generally invert this: Availability and Integrity of the physical process take priority, with Confidentiality typically the lowest priority (though still relevant, particularly for engineering data, recipes, and proprietary process information).

2.3 Reliability and Process Integrity

OT systems must behave predictably and deterministically. A security control that introduces unpredictable latency, unplanned reboots, or unexpected network behavior can itself become a safety or production risk. Process integrity — ensuring sensor readings, setpoints, and control outputs are accurate and untampered — is a core OT security objective distinct from general data integrity in IT.

2.4 Defense-in-Depth

Defense-in-depth applies multiple, layered, and independent controls so that failure of any single control does not result in compromise. In OT, this typically spans network segmentation, access control, endpoint hardening, monitoring, and physical security, rather than relying on a single perimeter firewall.

2.5 Zero Trust for OT

Zero Trust principles — verify explicitly, use least-privileged access, and assume breach — are increasingly applied to OT, but must be adapted. Continuous re-authentication or dynamic policy enforcement that assumes always-on connectivity and modern endpoint agents can be impractical or unsafe on legacy PLCs and RTUs. Practical OT Zero Trust typically focuses on strict segmentation, explicit conduit-level authorization between zones, and strong identity control at the human and engineering-workstation layer, rather than per-packet inspection at the controller.

> **INDUSTRY GUIDANCE**

> Zero Trust for OT is an evolving industry concept rather than a single mandatory standard. NIST SP 800-207 defines Zero Trust Architecture generally; applying it to OT is treated by Shieldworkz as industry guidance requiring case-by-case adaptation, not a normative OT requirement.

2.6 Secure-by-Design

Secure-by-design means building security into control system products and architectures from the outset rather than retrofitting it. IEC 62443-4-1 defines a secure product development lifecycle for automation product suppliers, and IEC 62443-4-2 defines technical security requirements for components — both are supplier-facing standards that asset owners can reference when specifying or procuring new OT equipment.

2.7 Least Privilege

Users, service accounts, and processes should hold only the access necessary to perform their function. In OT, this extends to engineering software licensing and project file access, not just network or OS-level permissions.

2.8 Asset Visibility

An accurate, current inventory of OT assets — including make, model, firmware version, network location, and criticality — is the prerequisite for nearly every other control in this guide. Without it, organizations cannot meaningfully assess risk, scope segmentation, or plan patch and vulnerability management.

2.9 Continuous Monitoring

Ongoing visibility into network traffic, device behavior, and configuration changes allows early detection of anomalies, whether malicious or the result of misconfiguration. In OT, this is typically achieved through passive network monitoring to avoid the availability risk of active scanning.

2.10 Risk-Based Security

Not all OT assets carry equal risk. A risk-based approach prioritizes controls and investment according to the consequence of compromise (safety, production, environmental, financial) and the likelihood of exploitation, rather than applying uniform controls everywhere.

2.11 Cyber Resilience

Resilience is the capacity to continue safe operation, or to recover quickly, in the face of a cyber incident. This includes backup and recovery capability, manual operating procedures as a fallback, and tested incident response — resilience assumes that prevention will not always succeed.

2.12 Why Traditional IT Security Approaches Often Fail in OT

IT Practice	Why It Struggles in OT	OT-Adapted Approach
Regular, automated patching	Vendor revalidation required; patching can void warranty or safety certification; outages are costly	Risk-based, scheduled patching aligned to maintenance windows; compensating controls when patching is infeasible
Active vulnerability scanning	Can crash legacy PLCs/RTUs with limited network stacks	Passive network monitoring; scanning only in test/lab environments or with vendor sign-off
Endpoint agents / EDR	May consume scarce CPU/memory on embedded or legacy OS; vendor support may not exist for the OS	Application allow-listing where supported; network-based detection as primary control
Frequent password rotation policies	Operator memorization needs during emergencies; shared operator accounts common on HMIs	Strong initial authentication + physical/procedural compensating controls; MFA on remote/administrative paths
Cloud-first architecture	OT often requires deterministic local control independent of external connectivity	Local control autonomy preserved; cloud used for monitoring/analytics, not real-time control loops
Standard OS end-of-life replacement cycles	Control system software may only be certified on older OS versions	Network isolation, compensating controls, and vendor-supported upgrade planning

IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE

Shieldworkz recommends that organizations resist the instinct to 'port' IT security tooling and policy directly into OT. Every control should be piloted on a non-production or representative test system first, with OT engineering sign-off, before deployment to production control systems.

Section 3 — OT Threat Landscape

3.1 Threat Actor Categories

Nation-State Actors

State-sponsored groups target critical infrastructure for espionage, pre-positioning for potential future disruption, or geopolitical signaling. These actors typically demonstrate high sophistication, patience, and a preference for long-dwell-time access over immediate disruptive action.

Ransomware Groups

Financially motivated ransomware operators primarily target IT systems, but frequently cause OT shutdowns as a consequence — either because OT depends on encrypted IT systems (engineering workstations, historians, domain controllers), or because operators proactively shut down OT as a precaution to prevent lateral spread.

Insider Threats

Both malicious and negligent insiders pose significant OT risk given the direct physical access and system knowledge held by engineers, operators, and maintenance staff. Insider risk includes disgruntled employees, coerced insiders, and simple human error during configuration changes.

Supply Chain Compromises

Attackers increasingly target OT equipment vendors, system integrators, and software supply chains to gain trusted access into multiple downstream customer environments simultaneously.

Third-Party and Vendor Access Risks

Vendors and system integrators frequently require remote access for maintenance and support. Poorly governed third-party access — shared credentials, always-on VPNs, absent session logging — is one of the most common initial access vectors observed in OT incidents.

Engineering Workstation Attacks

Because engineering workstations can push logic directly to controllers, compromising one gives an attacker a direct path to manipulate physical processes, making these systems a preferred target.

USB and Removable Media

Removable media remains a significant vector for introducing malware into air-gapped or segmented OT networks, frequently via legitimate maintenance or firmware-update activity.

Remote Access Abuse

Exposed or weakly authenticated remote access services (RDP, VNC, VPN, and vendor remote support tools) are a leading initial access vector for OT-adjacent incidents.

Legacy System Vulnerabilities

Long-lived, unpatched, and often unsupported OT systems accumulate known vulnerabilities over time, some of which may never be remediated due to vendor end-of-life status.

Unsafe Operational Practices

Practices such as shared accounts, disabled authentication for convenience, undocumented 'temporary' network bridges, and informal remote access arrangements set up by engineers under production pressure routinely undermine otherwise sound security architecture.

3.2 Real-World Case Studies and Lessons Learned

Stuxnet (discovered 2010)

Stuxnet was a highly sophisticated worm publicly reported to have targeted Siemens PLC-based centrifuge control systems, reportedly linked to Iran's uranium enrichment program. It combined multiple zero-day Windows vulnerabilities with the ability to manipulate PLC logic while feeding falsified sensor data back to operators, masking the physical damage being caused.

Lessons learned: air-gapped networks are not immune (Stuxnet reportedly spread via removable media); attackers with sufficient resources can achieve deep, protocol-specific knowledge of proprietary control systems; and detection must include the ability to identify falsified process data, not just network anomalies.

TRITON / TRISIS (publicly reported 2017)

TRITON targeted Schneider Electric Triconex Safety Instrumented System controllers at a petrochemical facility, reportedly reprogramming SIS logic. Public reporting indicates the attack caused an unplanned shutdown, which some analysts believe may have prevented a more serious safety event, and that the malware's purpose extended beyond disruption toward potentially disabling safety protection.

Lessons learned: safety systems are not inherently immune to cyberattack and require dedicated protection; SIS networks should be segmented from the basic process control network; and organizations should treat any anomalous SIS behavior as a high-priority safety and security event.

Industroyer / CRASHOVERRIDE (publicly reported 2016)

Industroyer was malware associated with a power outage affecting part of Kyiv, Ukraine, notable for its modular design supporting multiple industrial communication protocols (including IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEC 61850), allowing it to directly interact with grid substation equipment.

Lessons learned: protocol-aware malware can directly manipulate grid and substation devices without needing to exploit a traditional software vulnerability; and utilities should monitor for unauthorized or anomalous use of legitimate ICS protocol commands, not only malware signatures.

Colonial Pipeline (2021)

A ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline's IT systems led the company to proactively shut down pipeline operations as a precaution, resulting in fuel supply disruption across parts of the U.S. East Coast. Public reporting attributed initial access to a compromised VPN account that reportedly lacked multi-factor authentication.

Lessons learned: OT does not need to be directly compromised for an incident to cause major OT disruption — IT/OT interdependency alone can force a shutdown; and basic controls such as MFA on remote access remain foundational, not optional, even for large, well-resourced operators.

Norsk Hydro (2019)

A LockerGoga ransomware attack against Norsk Hydro, a global aluminum producer, affected IT systems broadly and forced a shift to manual operations at some production facilities. The company was notable for its transparent public disclosure throughout its response and recovery.

Lessons learned: manual operating procedures and trained personnel able to execute them are a critical resilience capability when digital control is unavailable; and transparent communication during an incident can preserve stakeholder trust even amid significant disruption.

> **INDUSTRY GUIDANCE**
>
> These case studies are drawn from extensive public reporting and post-incident analysis. Some technical details (attribution, precise causal chains, full scope of impact) remain contested or incompletely disclosed in public sources; organizations should treat the summaries above as widely reported industry lessons rather than forensically verified fact in every detail.

Section 4 — Standards and Compliance

This section provides a practitioner-level overview of the standards and regulatory frameworks most commonly referenced in OT security programs. Scope and applicability are described at a general level; organizations should consult the current published text of each standard for authoritative clause-level requirements, as standards are periodically revised.

4.1 IEC 62443 (ISA/IEC 62443 Series)

IEC 62443 is the leading international standard series for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) security, developed jointly by ISA and IEC. It is organized into four groups of documents:

- General (62443-1-x): foundational concepts, terminology, and models, including the zone and conduit model and security levels (SL 1–4).
- Policies & Procedures (62443-2-x): requirements for an asset owner's security management system (62443-2-1) and patch management practices (62443-2-3).
- System (62443-3-x): system-level security requirements (62443-3-3) and security risk assessment for system design (62443-3-2).
- Component (62443-4-x): secure product development lifecycle requirements for suppliers (62443-4-1) and technical component security requirements (62443-4-2).

62443-6-1 addresses conformity assessment methodology for the series, relevant to certification bodies and organizations pursuing formal conformance.

> **NORMATIVE REQUIREMENT**
> Where an organization has contractually committed to IEC 62443 conformance (e.g., as a procurement requirement placed on a system integrator or product vendor), the relevant part's requirements become mandatory obligations under that contract. Absent such a contractual or regulatory mandate, IEC 62443 functions as a voluntary consensus standard that organizations may adopt as their reference framework.

4.2 NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, provides overview guidance, threat and vulnerability context, and recommended security controls (via cross-reference to NIST SP 800-53) tailored for ICS/OT environments. It is guidance rather than a regulation in itself, though U.S. federal agencies and contractors may be required to apply it as part of broader federal information security obligations.

4.3 NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0

NIST CSF 2.0 organizes cybersecurity outcomes into six functions — Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover — providing a common vocabulary for describing and communicating cybersecurity posture. CSF is voluntary guidance; it is often used as an organizing structure for OT security programs and executive reporting, including by organizations not otherwise subject to U.S. regulation.

4.4 NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)

The NIST RMF (described principally in NIST SP 800-37) defines a structured process — categorize, select, implement, assess, authorize, monitor — for managing information system risk. It is mandatory for U.S. federal information systems (including many OT systems operated by or for federal agencies) but is used voluntarily elsewhere as a structured risk management methodology.

4.5 NERC CIP

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) standards are mandatory, enforceable reliability standards applicable to the Bulk Electric System (BES) in North America, covering areas such as security management controls, personnel and training, electronic security perimeters, physical security, systems security management, incident reporting, recovery plans, configuration change management, and supply chain risk management. NERC CIP applicability depends on an entity's registration and the classification of its BES Cyber Systems (e.g., high, medium, or low impact) — organizations should confirm their specific applicability through NERC's registration and standards documentation rather than assume blanket applicability.

4.6 ISO/IEC 27001

ISO/IEC 27001 specifies requirements for an Information Security Management System (ISMS) and is certifiable. It is a general-purpose (IT-oriented) standard; it does not natively address OT-specific concerns such as safety or process availability, which is why it is commonly paired with OT-specific guidance such as ISO/IEC 27019 or IEC 62443 for industrial organizations.

4.7 ISO/IEC 27019

ISO/IEC 27019 provides information security controls for the energy utility industry, extending ISO/IEC 27001/27002 guidance to process control systems used in electricity, gas, oil, and heat supply. It is guidance intended to be applied alongside ISO/IEC 27001, not a fully standalone management system standard.

4.8 EU NIS2 Directive

The NIS2 Directive is an EU-wide legal framework requiring designated 'essential' and 'important' entities across multiple sectors (including energy, water, transport, health, and manufacturing of certain products) to implement risk management measures and report significant incidents to national authorities. NIS2 is a directive transposed into the national law of EU member states, so specific obligations, thresholds, and enforcement mechanisms vary by member state's implementing legislation — organizations should confirm requirements under their applicable national transposition.

4.9 EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)

The Cyber Resilience Act establishes EU-wide cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements placed on the EU market, including obligations on manufacturers relating to secure-by-design, vulnerability handling, and reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities. It is

primarily a product-manufacturer-facing regulation; industrial asset owners are affected indirectly, through the compliance status of the OT/IIoT products they procure.

4.10 UAE Information Assurance Regulations

The UAE's Information Assurance (IA) regulatory framework, issued by the UAE Cyber Security Council (formerly the Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority / TDRA), establishes information security management requirements applicable to government entities and critical infrastructure sectors operating in the UAE. Specific applicability and control baselines should be confirmed against the current regulation published by the relevant UAE authority, as governance of this framework has evolved over time.

4.11 Saudi Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC) / OTCC

The Saudi National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA) publishes the Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC), a mandatory baseline for government and critical national infrastructure entities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, alongside sector- and domain-specific controls such as the Operational Technology Cybersecurity Controls (OTCC), which extend baseline requirements to OT environments. Applicability, scope, and specific control text should be confirmed against the current NCA-published source, as Shieldworkz has separately produced detailed OTCC-1:2022 compliance material grounded directly in NCA source text.

4.12 Australian Essential Eight

The Essential Eight, published by the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), is a prioritized set of mitigation strategies (originally developed for IT environments) organized into maturity levels. It is mandatory for non-corporate Commonwealth entities in Australia and is voluntarily adopted elsewhere as a baseline hardening framework. It was not designed specifically for OT, and organizations applying it to industrial environments should adapt strategies such as patching and application control with OT operational constraints in mind rather than applying IT timelines directly.

4.13 Standards Comparison and Mapping

Standard / Framework	Nature	Primary Scope	Mandatory or Voluntary
IEC 62443 series	Technical & management standard	IACS/OT asset owners, integrators, product suppliers	Voluntary unless contractually or regulatorily mandated
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3	Guidance document	OT/ICS security controls and practices	Guidance; mandatory only where referenced by applicable regulation/contract
NIST CSF 2.0	Voluntary framework	Cross-sector cybersecurity outcomes	Voluntary
NIST RMF (SP 800-37)	Risk management process	U.S. federal information systems	Mandatory for U.S. federal systems; voluntary elsewhere
NERC CIP	Enforceable reliability standard	North American Bulk Electric System	Mandatory for registered, in-scope entities
ISO/IEC 27001	Certifiable management system standard	General information security (any sector)	Voluntary / certification-driven
ISO/IEC 27019	Sector guidance	Energy utility process control	Voluntary, extends ISO/IEC 27001
EU NIS2 Directive	EU legal directive	Essential/important entities, multiple sectors	Mandatory per national transposition
EU Cyber Resilience Act	EU regulation	Manufacturers of products with digital elements	Mandatory for in-scope manufacturers
UAE IA Regulations	National regulatory framework	UAE government & critical infrastructure	Mandatory for in-scope entities
Saudi ECC / OTCC	National regulatory controls	Saudi government & critical national infrastructure, OT specifically under OTCC	Mandatory for in-scope entities
Australian Essential Eight	Prioritized mitigation strategy set	IT baseline, adaptable to OT	Mandatory for non-corporate Commonwealth entities; voluntary elsewhere

> **NOTICE**
>
> This comparison is a simplified overview for orientation purposes. It does not substitute for legal or compliance advice; organizations should confirm current, jurisdiction-specific applicability with qualified legal or regulatory counsel and the primary source text of each framework.

Section 5 — Building an OT Security Program

Building an effective OT security program is a multi-year undertaking that spans governance, people, process, and technology. This section outlines the components of a mature program and practical guidance for organizations at different starting points.

5.1 Executive Sponsorship

OT security programs require visible, sustained executive sponsorship — typically from the CISO, CIO, COO, or a designated OT security executive — to secure funding, resolve IT/OT organizational conflicts, and ensure security is weighed alongside production priorities at the leadership level.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Shieldworkz recommends establishing an executive-level OT security steering committee with representation from IT security, OT engineering, operations, safety, and legal/compliance, meeting at minimum quarterly.

5.2 Governance

Governance defines who is accountable for OT security decisions, how risk is escalated, and how policy exceptions are approved. Effective governance explicitly bridges the IT security organization and OT engineering/operations, rather than placing OT security solely under one function's authority without the other's buy-in.

5.3 Policies and Procedures

OT-specific policies should address, at minimum: acceptable use of OT systems, remote access, removable media, change management, patch and vulnerability management, and incident response. IEC 62443-2-1 defines requirements for an asset owner's security management system and is a useful reference structure for OT policy development.

5.4 Asset Inventory

A complete, current inventory of OT assets — including vendor, model, firmware/software version, network location, physical location, and business/safety criticality — underpins nearly every subsequent program activity. Inventory should be established through a combination of passive network discovery, physical walkthroughs, and engineering documentation review, since no single method reliably captures all asset types (particularly serial and air-gapped devices).

5.5 Network Architecture Review

A structured review of existing network topology, identifying all IT/OT boundary points, unauthorized or undocumented connections, and any flat/unsegmented zones, provides the baseline for a segmentation roadmap.

5.6 Risk Assessment

OT risk assessment should consider consequence (safety, environmental, production, financial) alongside likelihood, and should be conducted per zone/asset criticality rather than as a single organization-wide exercise. IEC 62443-3-2 provides a structured approach to security risk assessment for system design, and NIST SP 800-30 provides a general-purpose risk assessment methodology that can be adapted for OT.

5.7 Security Architecture

Security architecture translates risk assessment findings into a target-state network and control design — typically expressed as zones and conduits per IEC 62443 concepts — including segmentation boundaries, remote access architecture, and monitoring placement.

5.8 Vendor Management

Vendor management encompasses security requirements placed on OT equipment suppliers and system integrators (e.g., requiring conformance to IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 where applicable) and ongoing vendor risk assessment as part of procurement and contract renewal.

5.9 Third-Party Access

Third-party (vendor/integrator) remote and physical access should be governed by formal agreements, time-bound access grants, multi-factor authentication, and session logging/recording — treated as a distinct risk category from internal user access given the frequency of documented incidents originating through third-party connections.

5.10 Change Management

Formal change management ensures that modifications to OT systems — configuration changes, logic updates, firmware upgrades — are reviewed, tested, approved, and documented before implementation, with particular attention to safety impact assessment for any change touching SIS or safety-related logic.

5.11 Configuration Management

Configuration management maintains an authoritative, version-controlled record of approved system configurations (PLC logic, HMI screens, network device configs) enabling detection of unauthorized changes and rapid restoration after an incident.

5.12 Vulnerability Management

OT vulnerability management identifies known vulnerabilities in deployed assets (via vendor advisories, CISA ICS-CERT advisories, and passive network fingerprinting) and prioritizes remediation or compensating controls based on exploitability and consequence, recognizing that immediate patching is frequently infeasible in OT.

5.13 Patch Management

Patch management in OT differs from IT in cadence and process: patches must typically be vendor-validated for the specific control system version, tested in a non-production environment, and applied during scheduled maintenance windows. IEC 62443-2-3 addresses patch management in the IACS environment specifically.

5.14 Security Awareness

OT-specific security awareness training — covering topics such as removable media risk, phishing recognition, safe remote access practices, and incident reporting — should be delivered to engineers, operators, and maintenance staff, not only IT personnel, and should use OT-relevant scenarios rather than generic IT content.

5.15 Continuous Improvement

An OT security program should be treated as an ongoing management system with periodic reassessment, metrics tracking (see Section 11), and structured incorporation of lessons learned from incidents, exercises, and audits — not a one-time implementation project.

5.16 Program Guidance by Maturity Level

Maturity Level	Characteristics	Priority Focus
Initial / Ad Hoc	No formal OT security program; little to no asset visibility; security decisions made reactively	Executive sponsorship, initial asset inventory, network architecture review, eliminate unmanaged remote access
Developing	Basic governance in place; partial asset inventory; some segmentation; policies exist but inconsistently applied	Formalize risk assessment, complete segmentation roadmap, passive monitoring deployment, vendor access governance
Defined	Documented, repeatable processes across governance, asset, vulnerability, and change management	Extend monitoring coverage, formal incident response testing, patch/vulnerability management maturity, KPI tracking
Managed	Metrics-driven program with regular reporting to executive leadership; consistent cross-site standards	Continuous improvement loop, red-team/purple-team exercises, supply chain risk management, compliance automation
Optimizing	Program continuously refined based on threat intelligence, metrics trends, and incident lessons learned	Advanced threat detection, resilience testing, cross-industry information sharing, innovation in secure-by-design procurement

IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE

Organizations should honestly assess their current maturity level before committing to a roadmap. Shieldworkz frequently observes organizations attempting 'Managed'-level activities (e.g., advanced threat hunting) while still lacking a complete asset inventory — a sequencing error that reduces overall risk-reduction value per dollar spent.

Section 6 — OT Security Controls

This section organizes OT security controls into practitioner categories. Each includes objective, business value, implementation guidance, evidence of effectiveness, common pitfalls, and standards references. Implementation guidance reflects Shieldworkz field experience and is distinguished from normative requirements, which are called out explicitly where applicable.

6.1 Governance

Objective

Establish clear accountability, decision rights, and escalation paths for OT security across IT, engineering, and operations.

Business Value

Prevents security decisions from stalling due to unclear ownership and ensures risk is visible at the leadership level.

Implementation Guidance

- Establish an OT security steering committee with cross-functional representation.
- Define a RACI for OT security decisions (see Appendix C for a sample RACI matrix).
- Formally document the OT security policy framework and review cadence.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Documented governance charter, meeting minutes showing regular cadence, and a current RACI reviewed within the last 12 months.

Common Pitfalls

- Governance owned solely by IT without OT engineering authority.
- Steering committee exists on paper but does not meet regularly.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-2-1 (security management system requirements); NIST CSF 2.0 Govern function.

6.2 Asset Management

Objective

Maintain a complete, accurate, and current inventory of all OT assets and their attributes.

Business Value

Enables risk assessment, incident response, and vulnerability management; without it, nearly every other control category is degraded.

Implementation Guidance

- Combine passive network discovery, physical walkthroughs, and engineering documentation review.

- Capture vendor, model, firmware/software version, network location, physical location, and criticality for each asset.
- Establish a change process to keep the inventory current as assets are added, replaced, or decommissioned.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Inventory completeness validated against an independent physical walkthrough or passive discovery pass; inventory age within the organization's defined refresh cycle.

Common Pitfalls

- Relying solely on passive network discovery, which misses serial/air-gapped devices.
- Inventory built once and never maintained.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (asset management guidance); IEC 62443-2-1.

6.3 Identity and Access Management

Objective

Ensure only authorized individuals and services can access OT systems, with access proportional to role.

Business Value

Reduces the attack surface from compromised credentials and limits blast radius if an account is compromised.

Implementation Guidance

- Implement individual (non-shared) accounts wherever technically and operationally feasible.
- Apply least privilege and role-based access control for engineering, operator, and administrative functions.
- Deploy multi-factor authentication for all remote and administrative access paths.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Access review records showing periodic recertification; MFA enforcement logs for remote/admin access.

Common Pitfalls

- Shared HMI/operator accounts persisting indefinitely without compensating controls.
- MFA applied to IT but not extended to OT remote access paths.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-3 (system requirement SR 1.x, access control); NIST SP 800-53 (AC family, referenced by SP 800-82 Rev. 3).

6.4 Network Segmentation

Objective

Divide the OT environment into zones with controlled conduits between them, limiting lateral movement.

Business Value

Contains the spread of an incident and reduces the likelihood that an IT compromise reaches the control layer.

Implementation Guidance

- Define zones and conduits based on risk assessment (per IEC 62443-3-2 concepts), not solely on existing physical topology.
- Establish a dedicated IT/OT DMZ; disallow direct traffic between enterprise IT and OT supervisory/control zones.
- Segment Safety Instrumented System networks from the Basic Process Control System network.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Network architecture diagrams reflecting actual (not intended) topology; firewall rule review confirming deny-by-default between zones.

Common Pitfalls

- Documented segmentation that does not match actual configured firewall/VLAN rules.
- Undocumented 'temporary' bridges added by engineers during troubleshooting that are never removed.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-2/3-3 (zones and conduits, SL requirements); NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (network architecture guidance).

6.5 Secure Remote Access

Objective

Ensure any remote connection into the OT environment (employee or vendor) is authenticated, authorized, time-bound, and monitored.

Business Value

Remote access is a leading initial-access vector in publicly documented OT incidents; securing it materially reduces breach likelihood.

Implementation Guidance

- Route all remote access through a dedicated, monitored jump host or remote access broker in the IT/OT DMZ.
- Require MFA and time-bound, request-based access grants rather than persistent always-on VPNs.

- Record and log remote sessions, particularly for vendor/third-party access.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Session logs demonstrating time-bound access; absence of persistent always-on vendor VPN tunnels; MFA enforcement records.

Common Pitfalls

- Always-on VPN tunnels left open for vendor convenience.
- Remote access permitted directly to Level 1/2 devices without traversing a DMZ jump host.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-3 (SR 1.13, remote access control); NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.6 Endpoint Protection

Objective

Protect OT endpoints (engineering workstations, HMIs, servers) from malware while respecting OT performance and support constraints.

Business Value

Reduces risk of malware disruption without introducing availability risk from incompatible or resource-heavy agents.

Implementation Guidance

- Use application allow-listing where endpoint OS/vendor support permits, rather than traditional signature-based AV alone.
- Validate any endpoint agent with the control system vendor before deployment to production.
- Harden endpoints by removing unnecessary software, services, and local admin rights.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Endpoint hardening baseline documentation; vendor validation records for deployed security agents.

Common Pitfalls

- Deploying IT-standard EDR agents to legacy OT endpoints without vendor validation, risking system instability.
- Assuming allow-listing alone removes the need for network-based monitoring.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-3 (SR 3.2, malicious code protection); NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.7 Monitoring and Detection

Objective

Detect anomalous or malicious activity within OT networks and systems in a timely manner.

Business Value

Materially reduces dwell time and enables containment before an incident causes physical or safety consequence.

Implementation Guidance

- Deploy passive network monitoring/sensors at key segmentation points to avoid the availability risk of active scanning.
- Establish protocol-aware detection capable of interpreting OT-specific protocols (Modbus, DNP3, EtherNet/IP, OPC-UA).
- Integrate OT monitoring with the SOC, with escalation paths that involve OT engineering for triage.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Sensor coverage map against the asset inventory; documented alert triage and escalation workflow; MTTD metrics (see Section 11).

Common Pitfalls

- Monitoring deployed only at the IT/OT boundary with no visibility into Level 1/2 traffic.
- SOC alerts routed without OT context, leading to missed or misinterpreted anomalies.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (detection guidance); NIST CSF 2.0 Detect function.

6.8 Logging

Objective

Capture sufficient system, network, and access logs to support detection, investigation, and compliance reporting.

Business Value

Provides the evidentiary basis for incident investigation and regulatory reporting obligations.

Implementation Guidance

- Centralize logs from firewalls, remote access systems, engineering workstations, and where supported, HMIs/servers.
- Ensure log retention meets both operational (incident investigation) and applicable regulatory requirements.
- Protect log integrity (e.g., write-once storage or centralized SIEM forwarding) to prevent tampering.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Log source coverage inventory; retention policy documentation; periodic log integrity verification.

Common Pitfalls

- Logs generated locally on devices but never centralized, and lost on device reboot or replacement.
- Retention periods shorter than applicable regulatory reporting windows.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-3 (SR 2.8–2.12, audit log requirements); NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.9 Backup and Recovery

Objective

Ensure configurations, logic, and engineering data can be restored quickly following a failure or incident.

Business Value

Directly reduces recovery time objective (RTO) after an incident, limiting production downtime and financial impact.

Implementation Guidance

- Maintain current, tested backups of PLC/DCS logic, HMI configurations, and engineering project files, stored offline or air-gapped from production networks.
- Test restoration procedures periodically, not only backup capture.
- Maintain physical/printed fallback documentation for critical configurations where feasible.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Successful test-restore records within the last 12 months; backup age against the organization's defined recovery point objective (RPO).

Common Pitfalls

- Backups stored on the same network segment they protect against, and lost in the same incident.
- Backup jobs configured but never validated through an actual restore test.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3; IEC 62443-2-1 (business continuity considerations).

6.10 Incident Response

Objective

Enable rapid, coordinated, safety-conscious response to OT security incidents.

Business Value

Minimizes safety risk, production impact, and recovery time, and supports regulatory reporting obligations.

Implementation Guidance

- Develop OT-specific incident response playbooks (see Section 8) distinct from general IT playbooks.
- Include OT engineering and operations in incident response team composition and exercises.
- Test the plan through tabletop exercises at least annually.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Documented playbooks covering top OT incident scenarios; exercise records with lessons-learned follow-up.

Common Pitfalls

- IT incident response plan applied to OT incidents without adaptation for safety and production continuity.
- No involvement of OT engineering in incident response planning or exercises.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-61 (incident handling guide, adaptable to OT); IEC 62443-2-1.

6.11 Engineering Workstation Security

Objective

Protect the systems capable of pushing configuration and logic changes to controllers.

Business Value

Engineering workstations are among the highest-consequence assets to compromise; securing them materially reduces the risk of direct process manipulation.

Implementation Guidance

- Restrict engineering workstations to dedicated, hardened systems not used for general web browsing or email.
- Apply strict access control and, where feasible, disconnect from the network when not actively in use for programming.
- Maintain up-to-date antivirus/allow-listing and current OS patching to the extent vendor-supported.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Inventory of engineering workstations with confirmed dedicated-use status; access logs showing controlled use.

Common Pitfalls

- Engineering workstations also used for general office productivity or internet access.
- Engineering software license servers exposed to broader network segments than necessary.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-3; NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.12 PLC and Controller Protection

Objective

Protect programmable controllers from unauthorized logic changes and firmware manipulation.

Business Value

Direct manipulation of controller logic is the mechanism behind the highest-consequence publicly documented OT attacks (e.g., Stuxnet, TRITON, Industroyer).

Implementation Guidance

- Enable and enforce controller-native authentication/key features where the platform supports it.
- Restrict physical and network access to controller programming ports.
- Maintain and compare logic against a known-good baseline configuration to detect unauthorized changes.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Baseline logic comparison records; documented physical access restrictions to control cabinets.

Common Pitfalls

- Controller programming mode left permanently enabled.
- No baseline established, so unauthorized logic changes go undetected.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-4-2 (component requirements); IEC 62443-3-3.

6.13 Physical Security

Objective

Prevent unauthorized physical access to control cabinets, network equipment, and OT spaces.

Business Value

Physical access often bypasses network-layer controls entirely; physical security is a foundational, frequently underinvested layer.

Implementation Guidance

- Lock and monitor control cabinets and network closets; log access.
- Apply badge/access control consistent with facility security policy to control rooms and server rooms.
- Extend physical security assessment to remote/unmanned sites (e.g., substations, pump stations).

Evidence of Effectiveness

Access logs for control cabinets and OT spaces; physical security walkthrough findings closed within a defined SLA.

Common Pitfalls

- Control cabinets left unlocked 'for convenience' during shifts.
- Remote/unmanned sites overlooked in physical security programs focused on main facilities.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-2-1 (physical security considerations); NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.14 Wireless Security

Objective

Secure wireless networks and devices used within OT environments (Wi-Fi, cellular, proprietary industrial wireless).

Business Value

Wireless connections can bypass wired segmentation controls entirely if not independently secured.

Implementation Guidance

- Use strong, unique authentication (WPA2-Enterprise or better) for any Wi-Fi in or adjacent to OT zones.
- Segment wireless networks from wired OT networks with the same rigor as any other conduit.
- Inventory and assess proprietary industrial wireless protocols (e.g., wireless HART) for their specific security capabilities.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Wireless network inventory and configuration audit records; segmentation validation between wireless and wired OT zones.

Common Pitfalls

- Legacy open or WEP-secured wireless access points still in use at remote sites.
- Wireless guest networks bridged to OT VLANs by misconfiguration.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (wireless considerations); IEC 62443-3-3.

6.15 Vendor and Supply Chain Security

Objective

Manage security risk introduced through OT equipment vendors, system integrators, and software suppliers.

Business Value

Supply chain compromise can provide trusted access into multiple customer environments simultaneously, making it a high-consequence risk category.

Implementation Guidance

- Include security requirements (e.g., IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 conformance where applicable) in procurement specifications.
- Assess vendor remote access practices and require adherence to the organization's secure remote access policy.
- Maintain a software/firmware bill of materials for critical OT assets where feasible.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Procurement documentation showing security requirements included; vendor risk assessment records.

Common Pitfalls

- Security requirements added to contracts but never verified prior to acceptance.
- No visibility into subcontractor or component-level supply chain for critical systems.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-2-1 (supply chain considerations); IEC 62443-4-1 (supplier-facing).

6.16 Change and Configuration Management

Objective

Ensure all changes to OT systems are reviewed, tested, approved, and documented, and that approved configurations are maintained as the authoritative baseline.

Business Value

Prevents unauthorized or undocumented changes from introducing vulnerabilities or safety risk, and enables rapid recovery after an incident.

Implementation Guidance

- Require formal change requests with safety impact assessment for any change to control or safety logic.
- Maintain version-controlled configuration baselines for PLC/DCS logic, HMI screens, and network device configurations.
- Reconcile deployed configurations against baseline on a defined schedule.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Change request records with approval trail; configuration drift detection reports.

Common Pitfalls

- Emergency changes made verbally or informally and never retroactively documented.
- Configuration baseline established once and never reconciled against live systems.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-2-1; IEC 62443-3-3 (SR 7.6, configuration management).

6.17 Security Testing

Objective

Validate the effectiveness of implemented controls through structured testing appropriate to OT constraints.

Business Value

Identifies control gaps before they are exploited, and demonstrates due diligence for regulatory and insurance purposes.

Implementation Guidance

- Conduct testing (vulnerability assessment, configuration review, tabletop or, where appropriate, controlled penetration testing) in non-production or representative test environments first.
- Obtain explicit OT engineering and safety sign-off before any active testing touches production systems.
- Scope tests to avoid unsafe conditions (e.g., avoid actions that could trigger safety system responses without prior coordination).

Evidence of Effectiveness

Test plans with documented safety sign-off; findings tracked to remediation closure.

Common Pitfalls

- Applying IT-style unscoped active scanning directly to production OT networks.
- Test findings generated but never tracked to closure.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-3-2 (risk assessment); NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.18 Secure Maintenance

Objective

Ensure maintenance activities (vendor visits, firmware updates, troubleshooting) do not introduce security risk.

Business Value

Maintenance activity is a frequently overlooked window during which temporary access, removable media, or configuration changes are introduced outside normal controls.

Implementation Guidance

- Require maintenance activity to follow the same change management and remote access controls as any other change.
- Scan removable media on a dedicated, isolated scanning station before use in OT environments.
- Log and review all maintenance-related access, whether physical or remote.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Maintenance activity logs cross-referenced against change records; removable media scanning station usage logs.

Common Pitfalls

- Vendor technicians granted informal, undocumented network access during site visits.
- USB drives used directly on OT systems without prior scanning.

Relevant Standards References

IEC 62443-2-1; NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

6.19 Business Continuity

Objective

Ensure critical operations can continue, in manual or degraded mode if necessary, during a cyber incident or system failure.

Business Value

As demonstrated in incidents such as Norsk Hydro, trained personnel and documented manual procedures materially reduce the operational impact of an OT cyber incident.

Implementation Guidance

- Document manual operating procedures for critical processes as a fallback to digital control.
- Train operators periodically on manual fallback procedures, not only digital systems.
- Identify and address single points of failure in both technology and personnel/knowledge.

Evidence of Effectiveness

Manual procedure documentation current within a defined review cycle; training records showing periodic manual-mode drills.

Common Pitfalls

- Manual procedures exist only in the knowledge of a small number of long-tenured staff.
- Business continuity planning addresses IT systems but omits OT-specific fallback procedures.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3; IEC 62443-2-1.

6.20 Disaster Recovery

Objective

Restore OT systems and operations following a major disruptive event, whether cyber, natural, or equipment-related.

Business Value

Reduces recovery time and cost following a significant incident, and supports resilience objectives at the organizational level.

Implementation Guidance

- Maintain a documented OT disaster recovery plan distinct from (but coordinated with) the IT DR plan, including recovery time and recovery point objectives per critical system.
- Ensure spare/replacement hardware availability or vendor SLA commitments for critical, long-lead-time components.
- Test DR procedures through periodic exercises, including realistic scenarios such as loss of a control room or primary historian.

Evidence of Effectiveness

DR plan review records; exercise after-action reports with remediation tracking.

Common Pitfalls

- OT DR plan assumed to be covered by the general IT DR plan without OT-specific validation.
- No pre-arranged spare parts or vendor SLA for long-lead-time control system hardware.

Relevant Standards References

NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3; IEC 62443-2-1.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Shieldworkz recommends scoring each of the twenty control categories above against the maturity model in Appendix H to identify the highest-priority gaps for the next planning cycle, rather than attempting uniform improvement across all categories simultaneously.

Section 7 — Where to Start: The OT Security Journey

This section provides a practical, sequenced roadmap for organizations beginning their OT security journey. The three phases below are Shieldworkz implementation guidance built on the principles and controls described in Sections 5 and 6; organizations should adapt sequencing to their specific risk profile and constraints.

Phase 1 — Establish Foundations (typically months 0–6)

- Secure executive sponsorship and establish a cross-functional OT security governance structure.
- Develop foundational OT security policies (acceptable use, remote access, change management).
- Conduct an initial OT asset inventory combining passive discovery and physical walkthroughs.
- Perform a network architecture review to document actual (not assumed) topology and IT/OT boundary points.
- Conduct an initial, high-level risk identification exercise to prioritize subsequent phases.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Expected outcome of Phase 1: a documented governance structure, an initial asset inventory covering the majority of critical assets, and a clear picture of current network segmentation gaps. This is a foundation-building phase — Shieldworkz does not recommend deploying advanced monitoring or active testing before this phase is substantially complete.

Phase 2 — Reduce Immediate Risk (typically months 4–12, overlapping Phase 1)

- Eliminate or tightly govern insecure/unmanaged remote access; migrate to a monitored jump-host architecture with MFA.
- Strengthen authentication across engineering and administrative accounts, prioritizing engineering workstations and HMIs.
- Begin segmenting OT networks at the highest-risk boundaries first (typically the IT/OT boundary and SIS network).
- Identify and plan remediation or compensating controls for unsupported/end-of-life systems.
- Harden and restrict engineering workstations to dedicated, controlled use.
- Review and formalize all vendor and third-party remote access arrangements.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Expected outcome of Phase 2: measurable reduction in the highest-likelihood attack paths (remote access abuse, flat networks, unmanaged vendor access) — the risk categories most frequently implicated in publicly documented OT incidents.

Phase 3 — Mature Security Operations (typically months 9–24+)

- Deploy passive, protocol-aware continuous monitoring across priority zones.
- Establish formal threat detection and SOC integration with OT-aware escalation procedures.
- Develop and exercise OT-specific incident response playbooks (see Section 8).
- Mature vulnerability and patch management processes aligned to maintenance windows.
- Formalize compliance management against the organization's applicable frameworks (see Section 4).
- Conduct regular security assessments (see Section 10) and track KPIs (see Section 11) to drive continuous improvement.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Expected outcome of Phase 3: a metrics-driven, continuously improving OT security program capable of detecting and responding to incidents, not solely preventing them.

7.1 Maturity Model Summary

Phase	Governance	Technology	Expected Risk Reduction
Phase 1: Foundations	Steering committee established; policies drafted	Asset inventory and network diagrams produced	Visibility established; risk becomes measurable rather than unknown
Phase 2: Reduce Immediate Risk	Vendor and remote access policy formalized	MFA, jump-host remote access, initial segmentation	Reduction in highest-likelihood external attack paths
Phase 3: Mature Operations	KPI reporting to executive leadership; compliance program active	Continuous monitoring, tested incident response, mature patch/vulnerability management	Reduced dwell time; faster detection and recovery; demonstrable compliance posture

Section 8 — Managing Security During Incidents

This section presents an OT incident response framework built on the standard preparation-through-lessons-learned lifecycle (as reflected in NIST SP 800-61), adapted for OT-specific considerations.

8.1 The OT Incident Response Lifecycle

Preparation

Establish OT-aware incident response plans, playbooks, and trained response teams before an incident occurs, including pre-arranged contact with OT equipment vendors and, where applicable, government/sector CERTs.

Detection

Identify indicators of a potential incident through monitoring, alerting, operator reports, or anomalous process behavior. In OT, an unexplained process anomaly reported by an operator can be as significant an indicator as a technical alert.

Analysis

Determine scope, root cause, and severity, with OT engineering involved from the outset to assess safety and process implications alongside the security team's technical analysis.

Containment

Limit the spread of the incident while preserving safety and, where possible, continuity of critical operations. Containment actions (e.g., isolating a segment) must be evaluated for their own operational and safety impact before execution.

Eradication

Remove the root cause — malicious code, unauthorized access, or compromised credentials — and validate systems are clean before restoration, including verification of controller logic against a known-good baseline.

Recovery

Restore systems to normal operation using validated backups and configurations, with heightened monitoring during the recovery period to detect any residual compromise.

Lessons Learned

Conduct a formal post-incident review, updating playbooks, policies, and controls based on findings, and sharing relevant lessons with sector information-sharing bodies where appropriate and permitted.

8.2 OT-Specific Considerations Throughout Response

- Maintaining safety: no containment or eradication action should be taken without assessing its safety impact; safety systems should never be disabled as a response action without documented engineering and safety sign-off.

- Minimizing production impact: response teams should weigh containment options (e.g., full shutdown vs. targeted isolation) against production and safety consequence, in consultation with operations leadership.
- Coordinating with operations teams: operations and engineering personnel must be part of the response team, not merely informed after the fact.
- Regulatory reporting: incident response plans should identify applicable reporting obligations (e.g., under NIS2 national transposition, NERC CIP, or sector-specific requirements) and designated reporting owners and timelines.
- Evidence preservation: forensic evidence (logs, memory captures, device images) should be preserved following documented chain-of-custody procedures, balancing evidence preservation against the operational need for rapid recovery.
- Vendor engagement: OT equipment vendors often hold specialized knowledge of their systems and should be engaged early, particularly for controller-level investigation or eradication.
- Business continuity: manual operating procedures (see Section 6.19) should be activated where digital control is unavailable or untrusted during the incident.

8.3 Incident Response Playbooks

Playbook: Ransomware Affecting IT Systems with OT Dependency

- Immediately assess which OT-dependent IT systems (engineering workstations, historians, domain controllers, patch servers) are affected.
- Consider proactive, controlled isolation of OT networks from affected IT segments to prevent lateral spread, following documented isolation procedures reviewed with operations.
- Activate manual operating procedures if supervisory/historian systems are unavailable or untrusted.
- Do not restore from backup until the ransomware's initial access vector and persistence mechanisms are understood, to avoid reinfection.
- Engage law enforcement and regulatory reporting channels per the organization's legal obligations.

Playbook: Unauthorized Remote Access Detected

- Immediately disable the affected remote access account/session and preserve session logs.
- Assess what systems and data the session accessed or could have accessed, in coordination with OT engineering.
- Reset credentials for any account potentially exposed, and review for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
- Review remote access architecture for the gap that allowed unauthorized access (e.g., missing MFA) and remediate before restoring access.

Playbook: Suspected PLC / Controller Compromise

- Do not power-cycle or reprogram the controller until logic has been compared against the known-good baseline and, where feasible, forensically captured.
- Engage the controller vendor for platform-specific investigation support.
- Assess safety system interaction before any containment action; involve safety engineering explicitly.
- If logic manipulation is confirmed, restore from the validated baseline configuration following change management procedures, and increase monitoring on the affected zone during and after restoration.

Playbook: Malware Outbreak on the OT Network

- Identify affected systems via passive network monitoring and endpoint telemetry where available.
- Isolate affected network segments while preserving safety-critical functions and coordinating with operations on any isolation impact.
- Use offline/isolated media scanning stations to check removable media before reintroducing it to any cleaned system.
- Rebuild affected systems from known-good, validated images/backups rather than attempting in-place remediation on critical control systems.

Playbook: Engineering Workstation Compromise

- Immediately disconnect the affected workstation from the network while preserving forensic evidence.
- Assume any logic pushed from the workstation since the estimated compromise window is untrusted; compare all downstream controller logic against baseline.
- Reset credentials associated with the workstation and review engineering software license server logs for unauthorized use.
- Rebuild the workstation from a known-good image before returning it to service, with updated hardening per Section 6.11.

> **NOTICE**
> These playbooks are structural templates, not exhaustive procedures. Organizations should develop fully detailed, site-specific playbooks incorporating their actual architecture, vendor contacts, and regulatory obligations, and validate them through tabletop exercises.

Section 9 — Strengthening Shop Floor Security

This section translates the control categories in Section 6 into practical, floor-level guidance for plant and site personnel. All items below are Shieldworkz implementation guidance intended to complement, not replace, applicable standards requirements.

9.1 Physical Access Controls

- Restrict access to control rooms, server rooms, and network closets to authorized personnel with logged entry.
- Extend physical security review to remote/unmanned sites (substations, pump stations, remote wellheads).

9.2 Cabinet Security

- Lock control cabinets containing PLCs, RTUs, and network equipment; log any access outside routine maintenance.
- Disable or physically secure unused programming ports on controllers within cabinets.

9.3 USB and Removable Media Controls

- Route all removable media through a dedicated, isolated scanning station before use on any OT system.
- Disable USB ports on HMIs and engineering workstations where not operationally required, or use port-control software.

9.4 Engineering Workstation Hardening

- Restrict engineering workstations to programming/configuration use only — no email, web browsing, or general office use.
- Apply vendor-validated OS patching and endpoint protection; maintain a current hardening baseline.

9.5 PLC Security

- Enable controller-native authentication features where supported by the platform.
- Maintain a current, version-controlled logic baseline for comparison after any suspected incident.

9.6 HMI Protection

- Avoid shared/generic operator accounts where individual accounts are operationally feasible; where shared accounts remain necessary, apply compensating controls (physical access control, session logging).

- Lock HMI screens automatically after inactivity consistent with operational safety requirements.

9.7 Switch and Network Device Security

- Change default credentials on all managed switches and network devices; disable unused ports.
- Maintain current firmware on network devices per vendor guidance and organizational patch management process.

9.8 Secure Remote Maintenance

- Require vendor remote maintenance sessions to route through the monitored jump-host architecture described in Section 6.5.
- Log and review all remote maintenance sessions; disable standing/persistent vendor access.

9.9 Wireless Network Security

- Use strong authentication (WPA2-Enterprise or better) for any Wi-Fi in or near OT zones; segment from wired OT networks.
- Inventory and assess proprietary industrial wireless (e.g., wireless HART) deployments for security configuration.

9.10 Vendor Access Management

- Require time-bound, request-based access grants for vendor personnel, both physical and remote.
- Maintain a current register of all active vendor access arrangements, reviewed periodically.

9.11 OT Asset Inventory

- Maintain a site-level asset inventory reconciled against the enterprise inventory (see Section 6.2) at a defined cadence.

9.12 Configuration Baselines

- Maintain and periodically reconcile configuration baselines for controllers, HMIs, and network devices against live systems.

9.13 Network Segmentation

- Verify segmentation is enforced in practice (firewall/VLAN rule review), not only documented on paper.

9.14 Backup Strategies

- Maintain offline, tested backups of controller logic, HMI configuration, and engineering project files.

9.15 Security Monitoring

- Ensure passive monitoring sensors cover the site's critical zones and that alerts reach both site and SOC personnel.

9.16 Operator Awareness

- Provide OT-relevant security awareness training to operators and maintenance staff, covering removable media, phishing, and incident reporting procedures.

9.17 Maintenance Procedures

- Ensure maintenance activity follows change management and access control procedures consistent with Section 6.18, regardless of time pressure.

9.18 Shop Floor Quick-Reference Checklist

Area	Action Item	Priority
Physical	Control cabinets locked and access logged	High
Removable Media	Dedicated scanning station in use before any USB use on OT systems	High
Remote Access	All vendor remote sessions routed through monitored jump host with MFA	High
Engineering Workstations	Dedicated-use only, hardened, patched per vendor guidance	High
Network Devices	Default credentials changed; unused ports disabled	High
Segmentation	Firewall/VLAN rules verified against documented architecture	Medium
Backups	Offline backup of logic/config validated via test restore in last 12 months	Medium
Wireless	Strong authentication and segmentation verified for all site wireless	Medium
Awareness	Operators trained on removable media and phishing risks in last 12 months	Medium
Vendor Access	Vendor access register current and reviewed	Medium

Section 10 — Assessing OT Security

This section outlines a practical OT security assessment methodology, reflecting Shieldworkz's field experience conducting assessments across manufacturing, energy, water, and pharmaceutical environments.

10.1 Assessment Methodology Overview

- Scope Definition: agree the sites, zones, and systems in scope; confirm safety and operational constraints on testing activity in advance.
- Asset Inventory Validation: verify existing inventory against passive discovery and physical walkthrough findings.
- Architecture Review: review network diagrams, firewall rules, and segmentation design against actual configuration.
- Documentation Review: review policies, procedures, change records, and prior assessment findings.
- Risk Assessment: evaluate consequence and likelihood per zone/asset criticality.
- Site Walkthrough: physically inspect control rooms, cabinets, and network infrastructure.
- Interviews: engage OT engineering, operations, IT security, and site leadership.
- Evidence Collection: gather logs, configuration exports, and supporting documentation for each control area assessed.
- Technical Validation: where in scope and safety-approved, validate segmentation and access controls through controlled, non-disruptive technical testing.
- Maturity Scoring: score each control category against a defined maturity model (see Appendix H).
- Risk Prioritization: rank findings by consequence and likelihood, not solely by control category.
- Reporting: document findings, evidence, and recommendations for both executive and technical audiences.
- Remediation Planning: translate findings into a sequenced, resourced remediation roadmap.

10.2 Sample Interview Questions

For OT Engineering / Control System Engineers

- How is the current OT asset inventory maintained, and when was it last validated?
- What is the process for approving and testing a change to controller logic?
- Are there any known undocumented network connections or 'temporary' bridges currently in place?

For Operations / Plant Management

- What manual fallback procedures exist if the HMI/SCADA system becomes unavailable, and when were they last exercised?
- How is vendor remote access to this site currently requested, approved, and monitored?

For IT Security / SOC

- What visibility does the SOC have into OT network traffic, and how are OT alerts triaged differently from IT alerts?
- What is the current mean time to detect (MTTD) and mean time to respond (MTTR) for OT-related alerts?

10.3 Evidence Checklist

Control Area	Evidence to Request
Asset Management	Current asset inventory export; last validation date
Network Segmentation	Network diagrams; firewall rule sets; VLAN configuration
Remote Access	Remote access architecture diagram; session logs; MFA configuration
Identity & Access	Access review records; account list with role mapping
Change Management	Sample change requests with approval trail (last 6–12 months)
Vulnerability Management	Current vulnerability register; remediation/compensating control tracking
Backup & Recovery	Backup schedule; most recent test-restore record
Incident Response	IR plan; most recent tabletop exercise report
Physical Security	Cabinet access logs; physical walkthrough findings

10.4 Maturity Scoring Model

Shieldworkz uses a five-level maturity scale, consistent with the maturity descriptions in Section 5.16, to score each control category:

Score	Level	Description
1	Initial / Ad Hoc	No formal process; reactive, undocumented, inconsistent
2	Developing	Basic process exists but inconsistently applied or documented
3	Defined	Documented, repeatable process consistently applied
4	Managed	Process is measured, reported, and reviewed at leadership level
5	Optimizing	Process is continuously improved based on metrics and lessons learned

10.5 Risk Prioritization

Findings should be prioritized using a consequence-likelihood matrix rather than control-category score alone — a low-maturity control protecting a low-criticality asset may warrant lower priority than a moderately mature control protecting a safety-critical system.

Consequence \ Likelihood	Low Likelihood	Medium Likelihood	High Likelihood
High Consequence (safety/environmental)	Medium Priority	High Priority	Critical Priority
Medium Consequence (production/financial)	Low Priority	Medium Priority	High Priority
Low Consequence	Low Priority	Low Priority	Medium Priority

10.6 Reporting and Remediation Planning

Assessment reports should include an executive summary (business risk framing), a maturity scorecard by control category, detailed findings with supporting evidence, and a prioritized, resourced remediation roadmap with owners and target dates. Findings should be traceable to specific evidence collected during the assessment, and recommendations should distinguish clearly between normative requirements the organization must meet under an applicable standard/regulation and Shieldworkz implementation guidance.

Section 11 — Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

The KPIs below provide a starting framework for measuring OT security program effectiveness at both executive and operational levels. Target values are illustrative and should be set by each organization based on its own risk tolerance and maturity trajectory; they are not normative requirements of any cited standard.

11.1 Asset Inventory Completeness

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of known OT assets captured in the current inventory.
Formula	(# assets in inventory / # assets identified via independent validation) x 100
Data Source	Asset inventory system, passive discovery tool, physical walkthrough records
Reporting Frequency	Quarterly
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined; commonly cited industry aspiration is above 95%, though this is Shieldworkz guidance, not a standards mandate
Executive Interpretation	Low completeness signals blind spots undermining every other security control
Dashboard Visualization	Gauge or trend line by site

11.2 Network Segmentation Coverage

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of defined zone boundaries with verified, enforced conduits.
Formula	(# boundaries with verified enforcement / total defined boundaries) x 100
Data Source	Firewall/VLAN configuration audit
Reporting Frequency	Semi-annual
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined based on risk assessment
Executive Interpretation	Gaps indicate potential lateral movement paths between zones

Attribute	Detail
Dashboard Visualization	Heat map by zone boundary

11.3 Vulnerability Remediation / Compensating Control Rate

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of identified vulnerabilities remediated or covered by an approved compensating control within target timeframe.
Formula	(# vulnerabilities remediated or compensated within SLA / total identified) x 100
Data Source	Vulnerability management register
Reporting Frequency	Monthly
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined SLA, typically tiered by severity
Executive Interpretation	Persistent backlog signals under-resourced vulnerability management
Dashboard Visualization	Stacked bar by severity tier

11.4 Patch Currency

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of in-scope OT systems on a vendor-validated current patch level.
Formula	(# systems at current validated patch level / total in-scope systems) x 100
Data Source	Patch management system, asset inventory
Reporting Frequency	Quarterly
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined, reflecting vendor validation cycles
Executive Interpretation	Low currency may be unavoidable for legacy systems; should correlate with compensating controls
Dashboard Visualization	Trend line with vendor-support-status overlay

11.5 Remote Access Governance

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of active remote access sessions/accounts that are time-bound, MFA-enforced, and logged.
Formula	(# compliant sessions or accounts / total remote access sessions or accounts) x 100
Data Source	Remote access broker/jump host logs
Reporting Frequency	Monthly
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined, ideally approaching full coverage
Executive Interpretation	Directly correlates to a leading OT incident initial-access vector
Dashboard Visualization	Gauge with drill-down by vendor/user

11.6 Mean Time to Detect (MTTD)

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Average elapsed time between an incident's occurrence and its detection.
Formula	Sum of (detection time − occurrence time) across incidents / number of incidents
Data Source	SOC/SIEM incident records
Reporting Frequency	Quarterly (rolling)
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined; trend should show improvement over time
Executive Interpretation	Declining MTTD indicates improving monitoring and detection maturity
Dashboard Visualization	Trend line, rolling average

11.7 Mean Time to Respond (MTTR)

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Average elapsed time between detection and containment of an incident.
Formula	Sum of (containment time − detection time) across incidents / number of incidents
Data Source	Incident response records
Reporting Frequency	Quarterly (rolling)
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined; trend should show improvement over time
Executive Interpretation	Declining MTTR indicates improving response readiness
Dashboard Visualization	Trend line, rolling average

11.8 Backup and Recovery Test Success Rate

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of scheduled backup restoration tests completed successfully.
Formula	(# successful test restores / total scheduled test restores) x 100
Data Source	Backup/DR test records
Reporting Frequency	Semi-annual
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined, ideally full coverage of critical systems
Executive Interpretation	Low success rate indicates recovery time risk during an actual incident
Dashboard Visualization	Simple scorecard by critical system

11.9 Third-Party / Vendor Risk Coverage

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of active vendors with OT access that have completed a current risk assessment.

Attribute	Detail
Formula	(# vendors assessed within policy cycle / total active vendors with OT access) x 100
Data Source	Vendor risk register
Reporting Frequency	Annual
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined
Executive Interpretation	Gaps indicate unmanaged third-party risk exposure
Dashboard Visualization	Scorecard by vendor tier

11.10 Security Awareness Training Completion

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of in-scope OT personnel (engineers, operators, maintenance) who completed OT-relevant security awareness training within the defined cycle.
Formula	(# personnel trained / total in-scope personnel) x 100
Data Source	Training/LMS records
Reporting Frequency	Annual
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined, ideally full coverage
Executive Interpretation	Low completion correlates with elevated risk from removable media and phishing vectors
Dashboard Visualization	Gauge by site/role

11.11 Compliance / Audit Readiness Score

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Aggregate maturity score against the organization's applicable compliance frameworks (see Section 4).

Attribute	Detail
Formula	Weighted average of control maturity scores (per Section 10.4 model) across applicable framework requirements
Data Source	Internal assessment or external audit results
Reporting Frequency	Annual, or per audit cycle
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined target maturity level
Executive Interpretation	Provides an executive-level proxy for audit/regulatory readiness
Dashboard Visualization	Radar/spider chart by framework domain

11.12 Incident Response Exercise Completion

Attribute	Detail
Definition	Proportion of planned tabletop/functional exercises completed within the reporting period.
Formula	(# exercises completed / # exercises planned) x 100
Data Source	Incident response program records
Reporting Frequency	Annual
Target Value (illustrative)	Organization-defined, ideally full completion of planned exercise calendar
Executive Interpretation	Low completion indicates untested response capability
Dashboard Visualization	Simple scorecard

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Shieldworkz recommends limiting executive dashboards to 6–8 KPIs that map directly to business risk, reserving the full KPI set for operational/program-management reporting.

Section 12 — Common Challenges and Best Practices

12.1 Legacy Systems and Unsupported Operating Systems

Many OT environments run controllers, HMIs, or servers on operating systems no longer supported by the vendor. Replacement is often constrained by capital cost, revalidation requirements, and production downtime.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Where replacement is not immediately feasible, Shieldworkz recommends compensating controls: strict network isolation, application allow-listing where supported, and enhanced monitoring around the affected asset, combined with a documented, budgeted upgrade plan rather than indefinite acceptance of the risk.

12.2 Operational Constraints and Production Downtime Concerns

Security activities that require system downtime (patching, testing, upgrades) compete directly with production targets. This is a legitimate operational constraint, not merely organizational resistance to security.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Align security activities to existing planned maintenance windows and turnaround schedules wherever possible, and quantify risk in terms operations leadership can weigh against production impact (e.g., potential downtime cost of an incident vs. planned maintenance cost).

12.3 Vendor Dependencies

OT asset owners are frequently dependent on a small number of equipment vendors for patch validation, spare parts, and technical support, limiting the organization's ability to act unilaterally on security findings.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Build security requirements into vendor contracts and renewal cycles proactively, rather than attempting to retrofit requirements onto existing agreements after a finding is identified.

12.4 Cultural Barriers Between IT and OT

IT security and OT engineering teams often have different priorities, vocabularies, and risk tolerances, which can produce friction, delayed decisions, or controls implemented without OT buy-in that are later bypassed informally.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
>
> Shieldworkz has found that co-locating IT security and OT engineering representatives within a shared governance structure (Section 5.1–5.2), and having each side explain their operational

> constraints to the other early, materially reduces this friction compared with top-down policy mandates alone.

12.5 Resource Limitations

Mid-sized industrial operators frequently lack dedicated OT security staff, relying instead on IT security teams stretched across both domains, or on OT engineers without formal security training.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
> Prioritize foundational, high-leverage activities (asset inventory, remote access governance, segmentation) over advanced capabilities when resources are constrained; consider managed security services for continuous monitoring where internal staffing is insufficient.

12.6 Compliance Fatigue

Organizations operating across multiple jurisdictions or sectors may face overlapping regulatory obligations (see Section 4), leading to audit and reporting burden that can crowd out genuine risk-reduction activity.

> **IMPLEMENTATION ADVICE**
> Map overlapping framework requirements to a single internal control set (see Section 4.13 mapping approach) so that one implemented control can be evidenced against multiple compliance obligations, rather than treating each framework as a separate program.

12.7 Common Implementation Mistakes

- Deploying advanced monitoring or active testing before completing a basic asset inventory.
- Applying IT-standard tools and timelines to OT without vendor validation or engineering sign-off.
- Treating segmentation as complete once diagrammed, without validating actual firewall/VLAN enforcement.
- Allowing 'temporary' remote access or network bridges established during a crisis to persist indefinitely.
- Building a security program around a single framework without confirming which requirements are genuinely mandatory versus voluntary for the organization's specific context.

12.8 Lessons Learned from Industrial Environments

Across manufacturing, energy, water, and pharmaceutical assessments, Shieldworkz consistently observes that organizations which invest early in governance and asset visibility progress faster through subsequent phases than those that begin with technology procurement. Organizations that involve operations and engineering personnel from the outset also report

smoother control adoption and fewer informal workarounds than those where security controls are imposed without operational input.

Section 13 — OT Security Roadmap (24-Month Illustrative Plan)

The roadmap below is Shieldworkz implementation guidance illustrating how the phases described in Section 7 can be sequenced across a 24-month program. Actual timelines should be adapted to organizational size, current maturity, and resource availability.

Quarter	Governance	Technology	People & Process	Compliance
Q1	Executive sponsorship secured; steering committee chartered	Passive discovery tools deployed for initial inventory	OT security roles defined	Applicable framework(s) identified and scoped
Q2	Foundational policies drafted and approved	Network architecture review completed	Cross-functional governance meetings begin	Gap assessment against chosen framework(s)
Q3	RACI matrix finalized	Remote access broker/jump host deployed	Initial OT security awareness training rollout	Compliance roadmap drafted
Q4	Phase 1 review with executive sponsor	MFA enforced on all remote/admin access	Vendor access register established	Baseline compliance scorecard produced
Q5	Change management policy formalized	IT/OT DMZ segmentation implemented	Engineering workstation hardening begins	Framework-specific documentation gaps addressed
Q6	Vendor security requirements added to procurement	SIS network segmentation validated	Manual operating procedures documented for top critical processes	First internal compliance self-assessment
Q7	Phase 2 review with executive sponsor	Passive monitoring pilot in highest-risk zone	Incident response plan drafted	Regulatory reporting owners and timelines confirmed
Q8	KPI reporting framework established	Monitoring expanded to additional zones	First IR tabletop exercise conducted	Compliance scorecard updated

Quarter	Governance	Technology	People & Process	Compliance
Q9	Quarterly KPI reporting to leadership begins	Vulnerability management process formalized	Awareness training refresh cycle established	Gap remediation tracking underway
Q10	Continuous improvement process defined	Patch management aligned to maintenance windows	Second IR tabletop exercise, informed by Q7 lessons	Framework mapping refined based on Q6 self-assessment
Q11	Steering committee reviews program maturity scorecard	Configuration baseline reconciliation automated where feasible	Cross-site standardization of OT security roles	External audit readiness review (if applicable)
Q12 (Year 1 close)	Year 1 program review and Year 2 planning	Monitoring coverage assessment against asset inventory	Manual procedure drills conducted	Year 1 compliance scorecard finalized
Q13–Q16 (Year 2 H1)	Governance model refined based on Year 1 lessons	Extend segmentation and monitoring to remaining sites/zones	Formal vendor risk assessment cycle operating	Address residual gaps from Year 1 assessment
Q17–Q20 (Year 2 H2)	Program metrics integrated into enterprise risk reporting	Advanced detection use cases developed with SOC	Purple-team or controlled testing exercises (where safety-approved)	External audit or certification pursued (if applicable)
Q21–Q24 (Year 2 close)	Full KPI suite operating; continuous improvement embedded	Supply chain security requirements verified across active vendors	Cross-industry information sharing participation established	Year 2 program review and Year 3 planning

Section 14 — Appendices

Appendix A — OT Security Assessment Checklist

#	Item	Status (Y/N/Partial)
A1	Current, validated OT asset inventory exists (within defined refresh cycle)	
A2	Network architecture diagrams reflect actual, verified configuration	
A3	IT/OT DMZ implemented with deny-by-default conduit rules	
A4	SIS network segmented from BPCS network	
A5	All remote access routed through monitored jump host with MFA	
A6	Engineering workstations dedicated-use, hardened, and access-controlled	
A7	Formal change management process covers all control/safety logic changes	
A8	Vulnerability register maintained with remediation/compensating control tracking	
A9	Patch management aligned to vendor validation and maintenance windows	
A10	Backups tested via restoration within the last 12 months	
A11	OT-specific incident response plan exists and has been exercised	
A12	Vendor/third-party access governed by formal, time-bound agreements	
A13	Applicable compliance framework(s) identified and gap-assessed	
A14	KPI reporting in place and reviewed by leadership	

Appendix B — Shop Floor Security Checklist

#	Item	Status (Y/N/Partial)
B1	Control cabinets locked with logged access	
B2	Removable media scanned at a dedicated station before OT use	
B3	Default credentials changed on all network devices	
B4	Unused network ports and controller programming ports disabled	
B5	Wireless networks in/near OT zones use strong authentication and are segmented	
B6	HMI screens lock after inactivity consistent with safety requirements	
B7	Controller logic baseline maintained and compared periodically	
B8	Vendor remote maintenance sessions logged and time-bound	
B9	Site asset inventory reconciled with enterprise inventory	
B10	Operators trained on removable media and phishing risks in last 12 months	

Appendix C — Incident Response Checklist

Phase	Key Actions
Preparation	IR plan documented; playbooks current; contact list for vendors/CERTs maintained; roles assigned
Detection	Monitoring alerts and operator reports triaged promptly; initial severity assessment made
Analysis	Scope and root cause assessed with OT engineering involvement; safety implications reviewed
Containment	Containment actions safety-reviewed before execution; operations informed and involved
Eradication	Root cause removed; controller logic verified against baseline before returning to service
Recovery	Systems restored from validated backups; heightened monitoring during recovery period
Lessons Learned	Post-incident review conducted; playbooks and controls updated; findings shared appropriately

Appendix D — Asset Inventory Template

Field	Description
Asset ID	Unique internal identifier
Asset Name / Tag	Site-standard equipment tag or name
Asset Type	PLC, RTU, HMI, engineering workstation, historian, network device, SIS, etc.
Vendor / Manufacturer	Original equipment manufacturer
Model	Model number/designation
Firmware / Software Version	Current installed version
Network Location (Zone)	Purdue level / zone per architecture design
Physical Location	Site, building, cabinet/panel reference
IP Address / Network ID	If applicable
Criticality Rating	Safety-critical / production-critical / supporting, per risk assessment
Support Status	Vendor-supported / end-of-life / unsupported
Last Validated Date	Date the record was last physically or technically confirmed

Appendix E — Vendor Risk Assessment Checklist

#	Item
E1	Does the vendor require remote access, and if so, does it comply with the organization's secure remote access policy?
E2	Does the vendor's product/service conform to IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 or an equivalent secure-development standard, where applicable?
E3	Does the vendor have a documented vulnerability disclosure and patch notification process?
E4	Is there a documented software/firmware bill of materials available for critical components?
E5	Has the vendor's access to the organization's OT environment been logged and reviewed within the last 12 months?
E6	Does the vendor contract include security requirements and audit rights?
E7	Is there a named security point of contact at the vendor for incident coordination?

Appendix F — Security Requirements Checklist (Procurement)

#	Requirement Area
F1	Vendor conformance to IEC 62443-4-1 (secure development lifecycle), where applicable to the product category
F2	Component conformance to IEC 62443-4-2 technical security requirements at the specified security level
F3	Support for individual (non-shared) authentication and role-based access control
F4	Documented, supported patching and vulnerability disclosure process
F5	Compatibility with the organization's network segmentation and monitoring architecture
F6	Defined end-of-support timeline disclosed at time of procurement
F7	Vendor remote access, if required, compliant with organizational remote access policy

Appendix G — Sample RACI Matrix

Activity	CISO	OT Security Mgr	Plant/Ops Mgr	Control Sys Engineer	SOC
OT security governance	A	R	C	C	I
Asset inventory maintenance	I	A	C	R	I
Network segmentation design	C	A	I	R	I
Remote access approval	I	A	R	C	I
Change management (control logic)	I	C	A	R	I
Vulnerability management	I	A	C	R	C
Incident detection & triage	I	C	I	C	A/R
Incident response execution	A	R	R	R	R
Compliance reporting	A	R	C	I	I
KPI reporting to leadership	A	R	I	I	C

R = Responsible, A = Accountable, C = Consulted, I = Informed. This matrix is a starting template; roles and titles should be adapted to the organization's actual structure.

Appendix H — Maturity Model

Level	Name	Description
1	Initial / Ad Hoc	No formal OT security process; reactive; undocumented; dependent on individual knowledge
2	Developing	Basic processes exist but are applied inconsistently across sites or teams
3	Defined	Documented, repeatable processes consistently applied across the organization
4	Managed	Processes are measured, reported to leadership, and resourced accordingly
5	Optimizing	Processes are continuously refined using metrics, incident lessons, and threat intelligence

Appendix I — Glossary of OT Terms

Term	Definition
Basic Process Control System (BPCS)	The control system responsible for routine, non-safety process control functions.
Conduit	A logical or physical communication path connecting two or more zones, per IEC 62443 zone/conduit modeling.
Distributed Control System (DCS)	A control architecture in which control functions are distributed across controllers close to the process, typically within a single site.
Engineering Workstation	A computer running vendor software used to configure and program controllers and safety systems.
Historian	A database system that logs process data over time for trending, reporting, and analysis.
Human-Machine Interface (HMI)	The graphical interface through which operators monitor and control industrial processes.
Industrial Control System (ICS)	An umbrella term for control system types including SCADA, DCS, and PLC-based systems, plus associated instrumentation.
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)	Internet-connected sensors, actuators, and edge devices used for monitoring and optimization in industrial settings.
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)	An industrial computer that executes control logic to operate field devices based on sensor input.
Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA)	A conceptual model segmenting industrial environments into hierarchical levels for architecture and security planning.
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)	A field device that interfaces with sensors/actuators and communicates data to a SCADA master.
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)	An independent system designed to bring a process to a safe state upon detection of unsafe conditions.
Security Level (SL)	An IEC 62443 concept describing the degree of protection required or achieved against a defined threat capability, rated 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest).
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)	A system providing centralized monitoring and control over geographically dispersed industrial assets.

Term	Definition
Zone	A grouping of logical or physical assets sharing common security requirements, per IEC 62443 zone/conduit modeling.

Appendix J — Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
ACSC	Australian Cyber Security Centre
BES	Bulk Electric System
BPCS	Basic Process Control System
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (U.S.)
CRA	Cyber Resilience Act (EU)
CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
DCS	Distributed Control System
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
ECC	Essential Cybersecurity Controls (Saudi NCA)
HMI	Human-Machine Interface
IACS	Industrial Automation and Control Systems
ICS	Industrial Control System
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IIoT	Industrial Internet of Things
ISA	International Society of Automation
ISMS	Information Security Management System
MFA	Multi-Factor Authentication
MTTD	Mean Time to Detect
MTTR	Mean Time to Respond
NCA	National Cybersecurity Authority (Saudi Arabia)

Acronym	Meaning
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIS2	Network and Information Security Directive 2 (EU)
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
OT	Operational Technology
OTCC	Operational Technology Cybersecurity Controls (Saudi NCA)
PERA	Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture
PLC	Programmable Logic Controller
RACI	Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed
RMF	Risk Management Framework
RPO	Recovery Point Objective
RTO	Recovery Time Objective
RTU	Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SIS	Safety Instrumented System
SL	Security Level (IEC 62443)
SOC	Security Operations Center
TDRA	Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority (UAE)

Appendix K — References to Authoritative Standards and Guidance

IEC 62443 series (all parts), International Electrotechnical Commission / International Society of Automation.

NIST Special Publication 800-82 Revision 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, National Institute of Standards and Technology.

NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, National Institute of Standards and Technology.

NIST Special Publication 800-37, Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations.

NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations.

NIST Special Publication 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide.

NIST Special Publication 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments.

NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Standards, North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

ISO/IEC 27001, Information Security Management Systems — Requirements.

ISO/IEC 27019, Information Security Controls for the Energy Utility Industry.

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2 Directive), European Union.

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), European Union.

UAE Information Assurance Regulations, UAE Cyber Security Council / Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority.

Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC) and Operational Technology Cybersecurity Controls (OTCC), Saudi National Cybersecurity Authority.

Essential Eight, Australian Cyber Security Centre.

CISA Industrial Control Systems advisories and alerts, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

This guide reflects publicly available standards, regulatory text, and widely reported industry incidents as of the time of writing. Standards and regulations are subject to revision; readers should confirm current requirements against each publishing body's official current release. This document is provided by Shieldworkz for informational and practitioner guidance purposes and does not constitute legal or compliance advice.

About Shieldworkz

Shieldworkz is a specialist OT/ICS cybersecurity firm with an NDR solution and AI-based tools for securing SCADA, PLCs and Cyber Physical Systems. We serve critical infrastructure operators, industrial organisations, and government entities across the energy, oil and gas, manufacturing, utilities, transport, and defence sectors.

Our service areas include OT security assessments (powered by OThello Assess with sub-24-hour assessment cycles), NIS2 and IEC 62443 compliance programmes, OT threat intelligence advisories, OT SOC design and implementation, and regulatory readiness engagements for NCA (Saudi OTCC/ECC), NERC CIP, SOCI, and Singapore Cybersecurity Act obligations.

NDR Solution: shieldworkz.com/products/ot-security-platform **| Media Scan:** shieldworkz.com/products/ot-security- **| Othello Assess:** shieldworkz.com/othello/assess **| Patch Management:** shieldworkz.com/products/patch-management-solution **| Regulatory Playbooks:** shieldworkz.com/regulatory-playbooks **| Remediation Guides:** shieldworkz.com/remediation-guides **| Reports:** shieldworkz.com/reports

About Shieldworkz

ISOC and Honeypot Locations

Honeypot Locations

Security Operations Center

Shieldworkz is a global OT security company founded by top industry experts to protect critical infrastructure using proprietary technology and a leading consulting platform, we partner with businesses to secure assets, networks, and programs across industries. Our services are tailored to each client's cyber risks and backed by the world's largest OT and IoT threat intelligence facility and a global research team.

Secure Your Industrial Future

Talk to us today!

From OT security assessments covering NIS2, IEC 62443, NERC CIP and other regional requirements to an OT security platform, Shieldworkz covers all compliance and industrial cybersecurity enhancement needs. Talk to us to learn how you can enhance your security posture in 7 easy steps.

Contact Us

Fritz-Schäffer-Street 1,
4th floor

Bonn, 53113, Germany

+49 (0) 228 / 929 39210

europe@shieldworkz.com

396 Old Colony Road
Richmond Hill,
ON L4E 5A5 Canada

+1 (437) 223-7770

americas@shieldworkz.com

Tenth floor,

Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates,
FAB Business Center

+971 56 660 5200

middleeast@shieldworkz.com

Gopalan Signature Tower,
No 6, 2nd Floor, Old Madras
Road, Benniganahalli

Bengaluru,
Karnataka 560093

+91 9059620557

apac@shieldworkz.com